炒股就看金麒麟分析師研報，泰斗，專科，實時，全面，助您挖掘后勁主題契機！
花旗萬字神文精譯：若何贏得營業與通脹之戰？營業戰的最終戰場在外匯阛阓，中國的決議將決定好意思國經濟走向
起原：地平線全球策略
花旗總管Mohammed Apabhai的一篇神文，他在上周四遺跡般地押中了特朗普的關稅稅率安排，華爾街致使有東說念主以為Mohammed是不是拿到了什么內幕訊息．．
全文共三部分，精校會在這幾天不息發出，
本文是第一部分，內行撥冗閱讀。
Ahead of the expected announcement of tariffs by President Trump on 2 Apr we look at what could be expected and present a framework that examines the decision making process of President Trump．
在特朗普總統展望于4月2日曉諭關稅步履之前，本文探討了可能的放膽，并提倡了一個分析特朗普決議歷程的框架。
Imagine that two people are playing a game - person A has been given $100 but has to share that with person B． Person A makes the offer of how much to share with person B which can either be taken or rejected - if person B takes the offer both people get the amount of money they have agreed to． If person B rejects the offer then neither party gets anything． How much should person A offer？
假定兩個東說念主在玩一個游戲——A得到了一百好意思元，但必須與B共享。A提倡給B若干錢的建議，B不錯選定攝取或拒卻。
要是B攝取，兩邊將按商定金額得回各自的錢；要是B拒卻，則兩邊齊得不到任何錢。那A應該提倡若干金額的分撥才合理？
The answer to this problem is an interesting problem in mathematics - the best part of economics is always mathematics． At first glance， it appears that the “fair” offer that should be made should be to split the money 50：50． Until it is realized that person B has got no money so even the offer of $1 leaves him better than where he starts off． The optimal Nash equilibrium is for person A to offer the smallest amount of money possible． However， if person B knows that person A is going to walk away with the bulk of the money， the sense of injustice may trigger person B to reject the offer because he knows he is causing more damage to person A．
這個問題在數學上是個很真諦的案例——經濟學中最精彩的部分永恒是數學。乍一看，似乎“平允”的提議應該是五五分紅。但一朝將強到B手頭一無系數，那么即使只得到1好意思元，他的處境也比起先更好。
按照納什平衡的表面，A最優的選定是提倡一個盡可能低的金額。
然則，要是B將強到A將帶走絕大部分的錢，這種不公感可能會促使他拒卻提議，因為他知說念這么會對A形成更大的耗損。
This “ultimatum problem” is a fascinating area of study and has applications in many areas including insurance claims， wage negotiations and most importantly for us， trade wars． Insurance companies generally offer around 11% of the amount claimed relying on the claimant’s desperation for financial relief and for the problem to go away as well as their financial strength to low ball offers． Under certain utility conditions it can be shown that the optimal level for person A to offer and which person B will consider acceptable is $30． Anything below $30 tends to get rejected as it causes a sense of grievance．
這一“終末通牒問題”是一個太空有天的接洽規模，等閑閣下于保障理賠、工資談判，尤其是與咱們關系最密切的營業戰。
保障公司常常只提供約11%的理賠金額，這種策略依賴于索賠東說念主急需財務扶持、但愿盡快了結問題的情緒，以及保障公司自身宏大的財務智商，從而壓低報價。在某些效率函數條目下不錯詮釋，A提倡并被B攝取的最優金額是30好意思元。任何低于30好意思元的報價常常會被拒卻，因為它會引發強烈的起火情懷。
We have repeated this experiment with audiences of hundreds if not thousands of people around the world （having to give away a lot of money in the process when a deal is reached） and the differences in countries and professions is stark． Audiences in Malaysia in particular are willing to strike a fair bargain while healthcare workers also offer 50%． Lawyers generally tend to offer around 30% while those in finance tend to offer less than 30% （often less than 10%） and subsequently seem to have the highest proportion of deal rejections．
咱們在全球范圍內對上百致使上千名不雅眾近似了這個實驗（在達成來往日必須真的送出不少錢），放膽敗露列國和各行業之間的互異極度彰著。
馬來西亞的參與者尤其愉快達成平允來往，醫療行業的從業者也傾向于提倡50%的對半分紅。訟師常常提倡大致30%的分撥，而金融從業者則傾向于低于30%（許多時期致使不到10%），況兼他們遭受來往被拒卻的比例最高。
It is interesting to see this within the context of the Sino-US trade dispute． When we look at the share of bilateral trade， we find that the US share has been averaging just 21.1% since the GFC triggering the sense of unfairness．
在中好意思營業爭端的布景下來看這一問題尤其真諦。
當咱們不雅察雙邊營業份額時會發現，自2008年全球金融危境以來，好意思國的平均份額僅為21.1%，這在一定進程上引發了“回擊允”的情懷。
The trade agreement that was reached between the US and China in 2019 was aimed at redressing that imbalance． That agreement has clearly failed as the US share of bilateral trade has increased only from 18.2% in 2018 to 22.4% in 2020 when President Trump left office and had risen to only 24.5% when President Biden left office． The low share of bilateral trade has left the US with a sense of grievance．
2019年好意思中達成的營業條約甘愿在于更正這一失衡步地。但該條約顯豁未能奏效——特朗普總統離任時，好意思國在雙邊營業中的份額僅從2018年的18.2%升至2020年的22.4%；而到拜登總統任期放膽時，這一比例也僅升至24.5%。耐久的低占比令好意思國產生了捏續的起火情懷。
The track record of the Obama， Trump and Biden administrations， in terms of curbing the trade deficit and increasing the US share of bilateral trade is mixed． Statistically there appears to be little difference between any of the administrations．
奧巴馬、特朗普與拜登政府在阻遏營業逆差和提高好意思方營業份額方面的進展可謂歷害各半。從統計數據來看，這幾屆政府的戰術惡果互異甚微。
President Trump’s answer to the problem is the introduction of tariffs． It is often thought that the numbers that President Trump talks about are random - that he just pulls out some fairly random numbers for the tariff rates that he is setting． The evidence suggests that this may not be the case， that there may be a plan behind the action．
特朗普總統對這一問題的回話是加征關稅。外界精深認為他設定的關稅稅率熟練松馳——似乎僅僅隨口報出一串數字。然則，有跡象標明，情況可能并非如斯，這些舉措背后大致存在一套系統性的考量。
Last year the US imported $429.6bn of goods from China and exported only $139.7bn resulting in total bilateral trade of $569.3bn and a trade deficit of $289.9bn． It is instructive to look not only at how much the application of tariffs would raise - in this context tariffs are seen as a US tax which would fall partly on the Chinese exporter who in 2019 was forced to absorb them by cutting their margins and partly by the consumer． It is unclear at this moment where the burden of the new round of tariffs will fall．
客歲，好意思國自中國入口商品總數達4296億好意思元，而出口僅1397億好意思元，雙邊營業總數為5693億好意思元，營業逆差高達2899億好意思元。
此時關稅的真諦不僅在于“征收了若干錢”，更值得溫煦的是它在誰身上奏效。在這種布景下，關稅本色上被視為一種“好意思國稅”，2019年中國出口商被動通過壓縮利潤來消化其中一部分，另一部分則由花消者承擔。至于新一輪關稅的最終處事將由誰承擔，現時仍不軒敞。
Now if we look at the “whole” trade balance including the tariffs we start to see what is happening． To completely eliminate the trade deficit with China， the US would need to impose a 67.5% tariff on all Chinese exports – with no retaliatory tariffs from China． President Trump has threatened to impose escalating tariffs of 10% per month up to a maximum of 70% （link）， with the remainder likely to compensate for Chinese retaliation． This is the number needed to eliminate the US trade deficit with China．
要是將關稅納入“舉座”營業平衡的分析之中，就能看清確鑿的結構性問題。若要絕對摒除對華營業逆差，好意思國需要對系數中國出口商品征收67.5%的關稅——且假定中國空虛踐任何抨擊性關稅。
特朗普總統曾阻擾以每月10%的速率遞加關稅，最高可達70%，其中多出的部分可能用于對消中國的反制。
67.5%這個數字，即是表面上摒除逆差所需的關稅水平。
The 10% tariff on all Chinese goods that President Trump announced on 1 Feb under Executive Order 14195 applies to all Chinese imports． The 10% tariff had the effect of rebalancing the US portion of bilateral share from 24.5% to 29.8%， just under the 30% minimum that the Nash equilibrium would have deemed as the “minimum acceptable”．
特朗普總統于2月1日依據第14195號行政敕令曉諭對系數中國商品加征10%關稅，該戰術障翳全部中國居品。
這次加征將好意思國在雙邊營業中的占比從24.5%拉升至29.8%，略低于納什平衡所界說的“最低可攝取區間”30%。
Chinese retaliation so far has targeted an average of 12.5% tariffs on around $20bn of goods， taking the US share of bilateral trade to 29.7%． The small amount of tariff that it raised was hardly worth it， but falling below 30% meant that it invited US retaliation． The US share of bilateral trade is currently 29.7%， which is still not enough – the sense of grievance continues．
中國方面迄今的抨擊步履是對大致200億好意思元商品加征平均12.5%的關稅，使好意思國在雙邊營業中的份額達到29.7%。天然加征的關稅規摹自身并不顯耀，但低于30%的占比意味著引發了好意思方的抨擊動機。
現時好意思國的份額仍處于29.7%，仍未達到自在水平，起火情懷一經存在。
It was for this reason that the next round of tariffs， which raised the levy to 20% on all Chinese imports， was not a surprise． The US now has 34.4% of bilateral trade which is in the minimum acceptable zone but given the past history and duration of the imbalance， as well as President Trump’s current expected utility function， this is unlikely to be satisfactory．
正因如斯，好意思國隨后的加稅升級——將系數中國居品的關稅提高至20%——并不令東說念主不測。現時，好意思國在雙邊營業中的占比升至34.4%，處于“最低可攝取”區間。但磋議到歷史失衡的布景、捏續時期，以及特朗普當下的預期效率函數，這一水平仍難被視為“自在”。
It is quite likely that the US will impose tariffs of close to 70% on Chinese goods to eliminate the trade deficit – that would then provide a good starting point to start trade negotiations． The actual point of agreement will depend on the individual utility functions of the respective leaderships in China and the USA．
好意思國很有可能對中國商品加征接近70%的關稅，以絕對摒除營業逆差——這將成為再走時轉營業談判的一個“合剃頭軔”。最終達成條約的位置，將取決于中好意思兩國指點東說念主各自的效率函數。
So far it would seem that the USA is keener to reach an agreement than China， even if it is a “bad” agreement． From that perspective the Biden approach to bilateral trade was， in some ways， more （although not quite） optimal．
舍棄現時，好意思國似乎比中國更首要隘但愿達成條約，即條子件并不睬思。從這個角度來看，拜登在雙邊營業中的作念法在某些方面反而更接近“次優解”，盡管并不統統感性最優。
It is also instructive to look at the relationships with some of the other US trading partners with which it suffers large trade deficits．
不雅察好意思國與其他存在較大營業逆差的國度的關系，一樣具有啟發真諦。
Of the top ten deficit countries， trade with Mexico and Canada is more balanced than with the others．
在十大逆差國中，好意思國與墨西哥和加拿大之間的營業相較其他國度愈加平衡。
What this suggests is that President Trump is using this as a “dry run” against relatively soft targets before moving onto the bigger targets like Vietnam， China． Most of the other countries are in the “acceptable but not fair” categorization．
這意味著特朗普本質上正在將部分國度（如墨西哥、加拿大）看成“演練對象”，為異日對準越南、中國等更“大體量觀念”作念準備。在好意思方視角下，許多國度被劃入“可攝取但并回擊允”的限制。
It is also instructive to look at the percentage tariffs needed on each country to rebalance the trade relationship． It can be shown that to rebalance trade requires a tariff percentage equal to the US trade deficit / imports．
值得進一步分析的是：要殺青營業關系再平衡，好意思國需要對列國商品加征的“表面關稅比例”。不錯詮釋，所需比例等于好意思國的營業逆差除以該國對好意思出口。
To completely rebalance the relationship requires tariffs of 34% on Mexico with no retaliatory tariffs and 15.3% on Canada． The 25% tariff on Mexico gives the USA 47.6% of bilateral trade assuming no retaliation and with Canada gives 52.3% of bilateral trade – taken as a NAFTA block the 25% tariffs restores the US share of bilateral trade to 49.8%．
若要統統重構好意思墨關系，則需對墨西哥征收34%的關稅（前提是不遭抨擊）；對加拿大則為15.3%。假定無抨擊行徑，對墨征收25%關稅會使好意思方在雙邊營業中的份額升至47.6%；對加一樣比例，則好意思方份額為52.3%。若以北好意思解脫營業區（NAFTA）為舉座，好意思國以25%關稅可將其在區域雙邊營業中的份額規復至49.8%。
Outside of China’s 67.5% tariffs， we expect tariffs of 63.6% on Taiwan， 52.2% on India， 50.2% on South Korea and 46.2% on Japan – retaliation will cause an increase in the US tariffs as it attempts to restore balance．
除中國67.5%的觀念關稅外，模子預測好意思國可能對臺灣加征63.6%、對印度52.2%、對韓國50.2%、對日本46.2%的關稅——若遭抨擊，好意思國或進一步上調稅率以規復營業平衡。
Tariffs of this magnitude， if applied in full， would raise $1.3tn assuming no drop in international trade． This is to be compared to the projected US fiscal debt in 2025 of $2.5tn． Tariffs of this magnitude would fund over half the fiscal debt – if they could be successfully applied．
若按此關稅幅度全面實踐，且不磋議外洋營業收縮影響，則表面上可帶來約1.3萬億好意思元的稅收。這一數字接近2025年好意思國展望財政赤字2.5萬億好意思元的一半——前提是這些關稅能夠確鑿告捷落地。
It is also instructive to see the level of tariffs needed to get to the minimum 30% acceptable region which could be the basis for trade negotiations…
接洽達到“最低30%可攝取區間”所需的關稅水平也很有價值——這或可看成營業談判的發軔……
…although we have to caution that at this stage it does not appear that the US is going for anything other than a complete elimination of the trade deficit．
……不外必須指出，現時好意思國的觀念似乎不是調解性談判，而是絕對摒除營業逆差。
It is possible that the Trump administration will do a deal on trade， especially given the seeming need for President Trump to achieve a deal， no matter how bad it is…
特朗普政府最終可能會達成某種營業條約，尤其磋議到特朗普個東說念主在政事周期中對“成交”有較強訴求，即使條約條目并不睬思……
…we are not there yet but especially if market movements impact his utility curve most countries may get away by negotiating away the tariffs． A deal is there to be done – not yet but under the right market conditions．
天然當下尚未走到這一步，但若阛阓變化顯耀影響其“效率弧線”，多數國度可能有機和會過談判消弱關稅壓力。來往晨夕會達成——天然還不是現時，但在符合的阛阓條目下，終將殺青。
The impact of a trade war is to reduce bilateral trade． The trade war during President Trump’s first term reduced bilateral trade by 15.8%． We would expect this trade war to be more ferocious， reducing bilateral trade by 25%， with the brunt of the impact falling on China and other US trading partners． In the first term， the trade war resulted in a 16.8% drop in Chinese exports to the US but only an 11.4% drop in US exports to China．
營業戰的凱旋影響是減少雙邊營業。特朗普總統第一任期內的營業戰導致雙邊營業總量下跌15.8%。展望新一輪營業戰將更為熱烈，可能使雙邊營業減少25%，而中國偏激他好意思國主要營業伙伴將首當其沖。在上一次營業戰中，中國對好意思出口下跌了16.8%，而好意思國對華出口僅下跌11.4%。
This can be analysed through the perspective of Rubinstein Bargaining， a simple game of alternating offers bargaining with a costly delay．
這一鼎沸不錯通過“魯賓斯坦議價”（Rubinstein Bargaining）的視角來分析，它是一種帶有蔓延老本的輪流出價博弈模子。
The $100 is to be divided between the two players as in our Ultimatum Game， but if the offer is rejected then there is a financial penalty that is paid and the $100 reduces to some lower value until eventually it drops to zero．
與“終末通牒博弈”類似，100好意思元將在兩方之間分撥，但若提議被拒，則將產生一定的“刑事處事性老本”，即100好意思元的總價值會隨時期貶值，直到最終歸零。
We will examine this in more detail as the trade war evolves． Suffice it to say that the 1982 paper by Rubinstein suggests that an optimal solution does exist．
跟著營業戰的演進，后續著作將長遠分析這一模子。這里只需指出，魯賓斯坦在1982年的論文中已詮釋，照實存在最優解。
So will tariffs work？ To understand this we need to play another game． Would you prefer a $10 chocolate for $5 or a $3 chocolate for nothing？
那么關稅究竟靈驗嗎？為了交融這個問題，需要換個花樣來看：你愉快花5好意思元買一塊價值10好意思元的巧克力，照舊免費拿一塊價值3好意思元的？
Clearly the $10 chocolate offers the higher economic value but theoretically as well as experimentally it can be shown that approximately 81.6% of people will take the $3 chocolate – it is to do with the “Theory of Free” which has implications for everything from healthcare services to advertising incentives．
顯豁，10好意思元的巧克力具有更高的經濟價值，但從表面與實說明驗齊不錯詮釋，約81.6%的東說念主會選定那塊免費但價值較低的巧克力。這與“免費表面”（Theory of Free）密切關連，影響范圍從醫療服務到告白激勵，障翳等閑。
Our utility function changes as soon as we need to pay for something – if something is free then we are invariant between having it or not having it and if it may potentially prove useful at some point in the future， we seem to prefer to have it．
一朝必須為某物付費，咱們的效率函數就會發生變化——若某物免費，東說念主們常常會對“領有與否”無感，但唯有它異日可能有用，大多數東說念主便會傾向于“先拿著再說”。
This probably explains why most households in the US and in the West more generally are full of cheap， fairly useless， Chinese products that may potentially be useful one day．
這也許能解釋，為何好意思國乃至系數這個詞西方的許多家庭齊堆滿了低廉、并空虛用、但可能“某天會用得上”的中國居品。
China has priced these goods at a “zero marginal utility value” where consumers are invariant to owning or not – consumers are happy to pay a minimal amount for something just in case it comes in useful some day．
中國將這類商品訂價在“零邊緣效率值”區間，即花消者對是否領有絕不珍愛——他們樂意花極廉價錢去買，只因“萬一有用”。
To get them away from this and to stop them from purchasing these “useless” products， what needs to be done is to raise the cost that the consumer pays above the “zero marginal utility value”． This is potentially what tariffs might do．
若要令花消者開脫這種“囤積式花消”，或罷手購買這些“低效”居品，就必須將他們所支付的老本提高至“零邊緣效率值”之上——這恰是關稅可能闡發作用的經濟邏輯。
To see an example of this at work， we can look at food wastage． When food is cheap and plentiful relative to disposable income， as it was before the Ukraine conflict， food wastage was relatively high．
要考證這少量，不錯不雅察食物迫害鼎沸：在俄烏突破爆發前，食物價錢低、供應彌散，相對可主管收入來說極具可得性，因此迫害進程也偏高。
The sharp rise in food prices in 2022 resulted in a drop in food wastage as consumers were no longer invariant to buying food that they did not need and were more discerning in their purchases．
2022年食物價錢飆升后，食物迫害大幅減少——花消者不再無訣別購入不需要的食物，花消變得更為感性與嚴慎。
Structurally the only long term way to reduce the trade deficit seems to be to change the spending patterns of US consumers – and tariffs can play a role in doing that by raising prices．
從結構性角度看，耐久減少營業逆差的唯沿旅途，是蛻變好意思國花消者的開銷模式——關稅看成“價錢杠桿”，可在其中闡發作用。
There is of course the question about whether eliminating the trade deficit completely is desirable． Many of the exporting countries have run up large reserves of USD which have been re-circulated into the purchase of Treasuries which has kept a cap on yields．
天然，也存在一個根人性問題：是否有必要統統摒除營業逆差？許多出口國累積了無數好意思元儲備，這些好意思元被再行過問好意思債阛阓，從而壓制了好意思債收益率。
Eliminating the trade deficit would reduce these reserves， causing bond yields and the USD to go even higher． We will work out the impact that eliminating the trade deficit would have on bond yields in a future piece．
若絕對摒除營業逆差，將減少這些好意思元儲備，進而推高債券收益率和好意思元匯率。咱們將在后續著作中具體分析這沿旅途對好意思債收益率的潛在影響。
In our next piece we will look at the impact of tariffs on currency markets and inflation and suggest how a trade war can be winnable but also whether an optimal solution that can be acceptable to all parties exists or not．
鄙人一篇著作中，咱們將探討關稅對匯率阛阓和通脹的影響，嘗試回答兩個問題：營業戰是否真能贏？是否存在一個系數參與方齊不錯攝取的“最優解”？
花旗萬字神文精譯：若何贏得營業與通脹之戰？營業戰的最終戰場在外匯阛阓，中國的決議將決定好意思國經濟走向
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